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pAbstract
Motivations for migrants to return clearly change with integration, but the time-changing
aspect of return migration has received little attention in the literature. This paper studies
how migrants’ preferences for the home country change with intermarriage, i.e., marriage
to a spouse from the host country. Specifically, I analyse the association between
intermarriage and three outcomes related to migrants’ home country preference –
intentions to return, remittances sent and actual return – using German panel data
(SOEP) for the period 1984–2012. The results reveal a negative association between
intermarriage and home country preference that is moreover stronger for female
than for male migrants. However, some of the effect seems driven by selection
since the relationship gets weaker once I control for person fixed effects.
JEL Codes: F22; J1
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Non-random out-migration of immigrants has been widely studied in the empirical lit-
erature. These studies realise that neglecting return migration can generate a bias in
cohort-based measurements of migrants’ integration and that it may reveal indirect
effects of migration1. However, the simple neoclassical static model, predicting that mi-
grants return when wage differentials decline, is unable to explain much of the ob-
served variation in return migration. For example, Dustmann (2003a) shows that a
rising wage differential may actually lead to higher return rates. Dynamic models that
take the endogeneity of the decision to return into account are better able to explain
migrants’ return decisions2. Dustmann (2001) suggests several motives that determine
migrants’ choice to return and finds that preference for the home country is an import-
ant factor in the choice process. However, in specifying the model, Dustmann follows
the rest of the literature and assumes that home country preferences do not change
over time.
This is a strong assumption, considering that many studies find a positive association
between duration abroad and integration, which lends support to the premise that with
time migrants integrate into host country society3. Changes in home country prefer-
ence may be particularly relevant for migrants who initially have weaker social attach-
ments to the home country, such as those who migrate when single and/or meet their
spouse in the host country. In this paper, I use panel data covering a 28-year period2015 Weber; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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country preferences change over time. This data set provides unique background infor-
mation of migrants and their spouses and allows me to study three types of outcome
related to home country preference: intentions to return, remittances sent and return
realisations. The goal of my paper is an empirical assessment of the research question:
Is marriage to a German spouse related to any of the three outcomes? My hypothesis is
that migrants’ preferences change with intermarriage, i.e., marriage between a migrant
and a host country national, and that intermarriage is negatively associated with home
country preference4. But to infer an association between intermarriage and migrants’
home country preference, it is empirically important to distinguish whether home
country preference changes with intermarriage or whether the relationship is a spurious
one and migrants who intermarry have lower preferences for the home country inde-
pendent of their spouse.
On the one hand, marriage to a native may be a factor that potentially influences
positive externalities in the host country5. On the other hand, intermarriage may result
from lower preferences for the home country, rather than influencing it. The literature
does not provide conclusive evidence as to whether intermarriage influences cultural
and economic integration or whether more integrated migrants are more likely to inter-
marry6. My study contributes to this body of literature by analysing the effect of inter-
marriage on migrants’ home country preference7.
The empirical analysis focuses on linear regression and fixed-effects estimation to deal
with unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for a spouse. If more integrated migrants are
more likely to intermarry, endogeneity of intermarriage should also be taken into account,
but as I do not have a suitable instrument to control for the concurrence of choice of
spouse and home country preference, I do not control for endogeneity in this paper8.
Instead, I control for individual-level confounding factors and selection on observables.
My main findings are that preferences for the home country differ between migrants
who marry a German spouse, migrants who marry a non-German spouse and singles.
However, much of the negative association between intermarriage and intended return
observed in the OLS estimates goes away in the fixed effects model and thus seems to
be the result of selection. In contrast, the negative association between remittances sent
and intermarriage holds even when I control for unobserved variables, suggesting that
migrants’ remittance behaviour changes with intermarriage.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section, the empirical models are out-
lined, followed by a discussion of the data and variables used in the analysis. Section 4




I start with a simple linear model to describe the relationship between intermarriage
and home country preference. The model is specified as follows:
Y i ¼ aþ b1M1i þ b2M2i þ b3M1i  Gi þ b4M2i  Gi þ Xicþ vi; ð1Þ
where Y denotes one of three outcomes related to home country preference – inten-
tions to return, remittances sent and the propensity to return – for individual
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struct the average, see the next section on data and variables). M1i is a binary variable
that is equal to one if the migrant married before migration and zero if not. M2i de-
notes marriage in Germany before SOEP. The variable is equal to one if the migrant
married after coming to Germany and zero if not. I exclude migrants who marry after
entering SOEP when estimating this model, thus M1i and M2i are constant over time in
the sample. A German spouse, denoted by Gi, is also a binary variable equal to one if
the migrant’s spouse is from Germany and zero if the spouse is of another nationality.
Thus, the interaction terms, M1i*Gi and M2i*Gi, identify whether the migrant married a
German spouse before or after entering the country, respectively. By specifying the four
dummy variables in equation (1), I cover all types of married individuals in the sample.
The reference group are migrants who are recorded as single throughout the observa-
tion period. Xi is a vector of variables indicating the averages of both demographic and
human capital variables such as age at immigration, duration of residence, years of
education and country of birth over the first five years in which i is interviewed. The
variable vi denotes the error term.
My second specification is based on a fixed effects model, which controls for unob-
served (time-constant) variables affecting both preferences and marriage decisions by
taking the difference of observations in time periods before and after marriage for the
same individual. In the fixed effects framework, I can estimate the effect of intermar-
riage on intentions to return and remittance behaviour for individuals who marry in
one of the years during which they are interviewed. I cannot estimate a fixed effects
model for realised return because there is only one observation for the return period. I
start with an equation similar to equation (1) but include the time dimension t denot-
ing the years during which the individual participates in the survey. Specifically, the
equation is:
Y it
 ¼ αþ β1Mit þ β2Mit  Git þ Xit

γ þ μi þ εit : ð2Þ
I collapse t to two time periods, such that t = 1 denotes years before marriage and t =
2 years after marriage and again take averages of Y and X over the two sub-periods.
Note that the sample used in the estimation is restricted to the sub-sample of migrants
who marry after entering SOEP. Mit is equal to one if the migrant is married at time t
and zero if he/she is single. Thus, by definition of t, Mi1 is equal to zero for all observa-
tions, and Mi2 is equal to one. Moreover, in equation (2), I separate the time constant
unobserved variable (μi) from the time varying idiosyncratic error (εit). Taking the
difference of the two equations estimated for t = 1 and t = 2 eliminates individual fixed




 ¼ Δ Y i ¼ β1 þ β2Git þ Δ Xiγ þ Δεit; ð3Þ
where Δ Y i corresponds to the change in intentions to return or remittances sent
from before to after marriage. The parameter β1 is the constant in the first differenced
equation and measures the effect of marriage. The main parameter of interest, β2, mea-
sures the additional effect of being married to a German spouse compared to being
married to a non-German spouse. γ captures the effect of time-changing observable
variables on the outcome. The variable Δεi is the error term.
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timates are not confounded by time-constant unobserved variables. If the association
observed in the OLS estimates disappears in the fixed effects results, this is an indica-
tion that the association may be due to selection. However, if the fixed effects estimates
are significant, this is evidence to suggest that there is a change in the outcome with
intermarriage9.2.2 Data and variables
I use the 1984 – 2012 annual waves of the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) col-
lected by the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW). The SOEP is a na-
tionally representative longitudinal survey that was launched in 1984 in the Federal
Republic of Germany10. The survey includes migrants from former guest worker re-
cruitment countries. They are oversampled, and I use a sub-sample of Greek, Italian,
Spanish, Portuguese, Turkish and Ex-Yugoslav migrants. Guest workers provide a con-
venient sample to study return migration because they have higher return rates than
some other migrant groups and all these migrants are free to decide when to return to
their home countries11. Participants are interviewed annually, and in the first year, they
are asked about retrospective information on their family as well as migration history.
This allows me to recover their marital status, marriage and migration dates.
I generate a dataset that contains background information on the migrants from the
overall database. Throughout the empirical analysis, I distinguish between males and
females and link all individuals in the sample to their spouses. As my main objective
concerns the difference in preferences for the home country between migrants who
marry a native rather than a non-native spouse, individuals with a spouse in the home
country are excluded. After these restrictions, the final sample includes 4,033 observa-
tions (2,119 men and 1,914 women). The sample is then broken down by marital status,
differentiating between migrants who are married and migrants who are single12. I de-
fine marriage as a formal union and do not include individuals who report cohabitating
with a partner in this category. About 80% of migrants in the sample report being mar-
ried at one time between 1984 and 2012. All other migrants in the sample are defined
as singles. The sub-sample of married migrants is further divided into three groups: mi-
grants who marry before coming to Germany, those who marry after migration but be-
fore entering SOEP and those who marry after joining SOEP. The group of migrants
who marry after joining the survey is the most interesting, because for these migrants,
I can compare home country preference before and after marriage. This is the sample
that I use for the fixed effects model estimated in equation (3). But considering that
this is a very small sample, I also base my analysis in the OLS regressions on the other
two groups. The distinction between migrants who marry before and after coming to
Germany is imposed in order to compare and contrast intermarriage effects on home
country preferences for these migrants, as it is likely that there are differences between
these groups of migrants. Migrants who marry before entering Germany are, for ex-
ample, more likely to be tied movers – that is, migrants who come to the host country
to join earlier immigrated partners13. A total of 13% of migrants in the sample who are
married report marrying in the same year as they join SOEP. This is an unexpectedly
large number, and when I compare these migrants to migrants in the four sub-samples,
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them to this group. Separating migrants who marry in Germany before entering SOEP
from those who marry after entering SOEP has the purpose of singling out migrants
who marry at some point during the observation period. Overall, this leaves me with
four sub-samples: migrants who marry before coming to Germany, migrants who
marry after entering the country but before they join SOEP, migrants who marry after
entering SOEP and singles.
In Table 1, I report some descriptive statistics of the variables I use in the analysis
below. Although I use a maximum of 28 years of observations, I restrict observations
of time-changing variables to the first five years after entry into SOEP and construct
means. This ensures that the analysis is not biased towards respondents who stay in the
survey for long periods of time and smoothes variation due to small sample sizes.
I construct three variables that capture migrants’ preferences for the home country:
intentions to return, remittances sent and actual return. The first variable is based on
survey information about migrants’ future intentions to return back home. In each sur-
vey year, migrants are asked whether they wish to remain permanently in the host
country or whether they wish to return to their respective home country at some point
in the future. This is a binary variable that is equal to one if the migrant has intentions
to return and zero if he/she intends to stay in Germany forever. I assume that inten-
tions are a close match to home country preference. Table 1 shows that more than half
of the migrants in the sample intend to return (65% and 67% of male and female mi-
grants, respectively).
My second variable measuring migrants’ preferences for the home country is based
on remittances sent to family in the home country. Migrants are asked every year
whether they send money back home. A binary variable is constructed that is equal to
one if the migrant reports sending remittances and zero if he/she does not. A variety of
factors motivate migrants to remit, including altruism, insurance, exchange and repay-
ment of loans (see Lucas and Stark 1985; Stark 2009; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001;
Agarwal and Horowitz 2002). Rapoport and Docquier (2005), furthermore, note that
the likelihood and size of remittances are likely to depend on whether and when the mi-
grant intends to return. In this analysis, I focus on remittances as a proxy of social attach-
ment to the home country and migrants’ investment in a network. I assume that if the
migrant remits, he/she is primarily invested in maintaining ties to the home country. On
the other hand, if the migrant does not remit, this is a sign of a greater investment in build-
ing a new network in Germany. Preferences in the home country and changes therein are
then likely to be reflected in remittance behaviour. Table 1 shows that, on average, 22% of
male migrants in the sample remit, but only 9% of female migrants report doing so.
The third variable on preferences for the home country is an actual future return. I
use panel attrition as a measure of return migration. SOEP includes reasons of panel at-
trition, one of which is Moved Abroad. This is most likely to correspond to return mi-
gration if the respondent is foreign born14. I follow migrants over the course of the
panel and construct an indicator variable equal to one if the migrant returns home
within the 27-year period. Of the sample population, about 25% returned home (see
Table 1). A return to the home country reveals an ex post preference but is no perfect
measure of home country preference. I mainly include actual return in the analysis to
verify the correlation between a migrant’s intentions and actual return.
Table 1 Summary statistics - Male/Female
Table 1a. Summary statistics - Male
Married Single All
Before moving Before entering After entering
Description to Germany SOEP SOEP
Average intentions 0.73 0.64 0.57 0.54 0.65
(0.36) (0.38) (0.37) (0.43) (0.39)
Average remittances 0.29 0.28 0.10 0.06 0.22
(0.30) (0.30) (0.17) (0.17) (0.28)
Return migrants 0.29 0.28 0.10 0.06 0.22
(0.49) (0.38) (0.26) (0.42) (0.43)
German spouse 0.04 0.14 0.28 0 0.12
(0.20) (0.34) (0.45) (0.32)
Age at entry 31 19 10 10 20
(6.93) (6.36) (6.20) (8.46) (10.92)
Year of immigration 1972 1972 1976 1970 1972
(9.00) (8.49) (6.63) (130.16) (61.34)
Years of education 9 9 10 7 9
(2.67) (2.58) (2.40) (5.05) (3.49)
German spoken 1.98 2.44 2.74 2.65 2.33
(0.64) (0.58) (0.39) (0.55) (0.65)
Number of children 1 1 1 1 1
(1.16) (1.23) (1.15) (1.36) (1.25)
Low income group 0.27 0.13 0.42 0.71 0.33
(0.45) (0.34) (0.50) (0.45) (0.47)
Medium income group 0.38 0.34 0.41 0.20 0.33
(0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.40) (0.47)
High income group 0.34 0.52 0.16 0.08 0.33
(0.48) (0.50) (0.37) (0.28) (0.47)
Greek 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.13
(0.35) (0.33) (0.25) (0.34) (0.33)
Italian 0.13 0.24 0.17 0.18 0.18
(0.34) (0.43) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39)
Spanish 0.11 0.13 0.04 0.12 0.11
(0.31) (0.33) (0.21) (0.32) (0.31)
Portuguese 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)
Turkish 0.39 0.33 0.57 0.37 0.38
(0.49) (0.47) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49)
Ex-Yugoslav 0.22 0.18 0.13 0.20 0.19
(0.42) (0.38) (0.34) (0.40) (0.40)
Number of observations 707 747 201 464 2,119
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Table 1 Summary statistics - Male/Female (Continued)
Table 1b. Summary statistics - Female
Married Single All
Before moving Before entering After entering
Description to Germany SOEP SOEP
Average intentions 0.73 0.65 0.60 0.58 0.67
(0.63) (0.38) (0.38) (0.44) (0.38)
Average remittances 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.09
(0.20) (0.18) (0.14) (0.11) (0.18)
Return migrants 0.34 0.18 0.10 0.24 0.25
(0.47) (0.39) (0.30) (0.43) (0.43)
German spouse 0.03 0.07 0.17 0 0.06
(0.16) (0.26) (0.38) (0.24)
Age at entry 30 17 9 11 21
(9.09) (6.23) (6.04) (9.86) (11.69)
Year of immigration 1974 1974 1978 1973 1974
(8.68) (9.12) (7.60) (108.91) (46.08)
Years of education 8 9 9 6 8
(2.83) (2.63) (2.70) (5.08) (2.85)
German spoken 1.71 2.16 2.65 2.57 2.06
(0.67) (0.70) (0.59) (0.67) (0.76)
Number of children 1 1 1 1 1
(1.20) (1.14) (1.00) (1.65) (1.26)
Low income group 0.45 0.39 0.34 0.22 0.33
(0.50) (0.49) (0.47) (0.50) (0.50)
Medium income group 0.21 0.23 0.33 0.23 0.23
(0.41) (0.42) (0.47) (0.42) (0.42)
High income group 0.34 0.38 0.34 0.22 0.33
(0.47) (0.49) (0.47) (0.41) (0.47)
Greek 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.12
(0.34) (0.35) (0.27) (0.30) (0.33)
Italian 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.16
(0.35) (0.39) (0.38) (0.34) (0.36)
Spanish 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.10
(0.30) (0.33) (0.16) (0.26) (0.30)
Portuguese 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08)
Turkish 0.38 0.37 0.54 0.43 0.40
(0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Ex-Yugoslav 0.24 0.18 0.17 0.26 0.22
(0.43) (0.38) (0.38) (0.44) (0.41)
Number of observations 782 644 155 333 1,914
Note. The numbers indicate mean values, standard deviations are in parentheses. Observations with missing information
on the nationality of the spouse are included. These are missing observations for the following variables: intentions to
return, year of education, German spoken and number of children.
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Germany and zero if not. Pooling men and women, about 9% of migrants who are married
have a German spouse. But twice as many men as women in the sample are married to a
native spouse (12% versus 6%), and a much larger number of migrants who marry after
joining SOEP have a German spouse than migrants who marry before this (see Table 1).
The majority of married migrants in the sample have a spouse from the same country of
birth (about 87%), and less than 4% have a spouse from some third country. Considering
the small sample sizes, I do not differentiate between these two groups15.
Table 2 presents the mean of intentions to return, remittances sent and realised returns
for migrants who marry a German spouse and those who marry a non-German, as well as
the difference of the means. It is clear from the numbers in the table that migrants who
marry a non-native spouse, on average, have higher intentions to return, are more likely to
send remittances and more likely to realise a return than their counterparts who marry a
native. The two groups are especially easy to tell apart by their intentions to return, with the
exception of migrants who marry after entry into SOEP. There is only a 3-percentage point
difference in intentions to return among male migrants who marry after joining SOEP, sug-
gesting that migrants in this sub-sample cannot necessarily be compared to migrants whoTable 2 Summary statistics by German spouse
a) Male
Married
















0.56 0.73 0.17 0.47 0.67 0.21 0.54 0.56 0.03
(0.41) (0.36) (0.41) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37)
Average
remittances
0.19 0.28 0.09 0.19 0.29 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.07
(0.23) (0.30) (0.27) (0.29) (0.12) (0.18)
Return
migrants
0.29 0.39 0.10 0.06 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.03
(0.46) (0.49) (0.24) (0.39) (0.19) (0.25)
Observations 28 617 98 619 54 138
b) Female
Married
















0.47 0.75 0.28 0.38 0.68 0.30 0.36 0.62 0.26
(0.41) (0.35) (0.41) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
Average
remittances
0.07 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.04 −0.04
(0.14) (0.19) (0.10) (0.18) (0.23) (0.11)
Return
migrants
0.11 0.36 0.25 0.09 0.19 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.06
(0.32) (0.48) (0.29) (0.40) (0.20) (0.30)
Observations 19 692 44 562 25 119
Note. The numbers indicate mean values, standard deviations are in parentheses. Differences are calculated by
subtracting the mean value for migrants with a German spouse from that of migrants with non-German spouse.
Observations with missing information on the nationality of the spouse are not included. There are also fewer
observations for average intentions: for males the number of observations are 28, 612, 93, 612, 47, 130, respectively,
and for females 19, 683, 40, 555, 22, 108. This is due to missing values in the variable.
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difference in the likelihood to remit and to return between migrants who marry a German
and their counterparts who marry a non-German is somewhat smaller. However, also the
overall sample means of these variables are lower (see Table 1). Differences in the sub-
sample of migrants who marry after joining SOEP are again the smallest. Actually, slightly
more intermarried females in this sub-sample report sending remittances. Otherwise, 4–6
percentage points fewer women who marry a German remit, on average, and 7–9 percent-
age points fewer men report doing so. The likelihood of returning is 10 or 12 percentage
points lower for male migrants who marry a German rather than a non-German before en-
tering the country or before entering SOEP, respectively, but there is no significant differ-
ence for those who marry after entry into SOEP. For women, there is a lot of variation in
the likelihood to return across the different samples. Most likely to return are women who
married a non-German spouse before moving to Germany (36% of whom return), and the
least likely to return are women who marry a German spouse after entering SOEP (4%
return).
Preferences for the home country and the likelihood of intermarrying are also likely to be
contingent on basic demographic and human capital characteristics. Table 1 shows the
mean values of the control variables included in the OLS model. On average, migrants in
the sample were in their early 20s when they came to Germany. Most migrants came to
Germany in the early to mid-1970s, and I only observe a lag of two year in average immi-
gration year for women.
Years of education provide me with a general measure of human capital. Average years of
education for men and women in the sample are 9 and 8, respectively. This means that
most migrants have completed secondary school, which, as a reference, takes 9 years in
Germany. Proficiency in the German language is a measure of host country-specific human
capital (Dustmann 1999). This is a categorical variable that equals one if the respondent
speaks German badly or not at all, two if he/she speaks it well enough and three if he/she
speaks it well or very well.
The number of children in the household proxies household size, as actual household
size is likely to confound changes in martial status and changes in household size.
I also control for personal monthly net income, measured in euros, and distinguish be-
tween three levels of income by delineating the group into terciles. Table 1 shows distinct
differences in income between the sub-samples. At total of 52% of men who marry before
entering SOEP are in the highest income group, while 83% of men who marry after entry
into SOEP are in the two lower income groups. Yet more extreme, 71% of singles are in the
lowest income group. For women, this pattern is not clearly discernible.
About 40% of migrants in the sample were born in Turkey, while 20% are
Ex-Yugoslav, and roughly 10% are Greek, Italian and Spanish, respectively16. Very few
migrants in the sample are from Portugal (only about 1%). Greece and Italy became EU
member states before 1984, while Spain and Portugal joined the EU in 1986. Migrants
from these countries face no legal restrictions when moving between Germany and
their home country. This is in contrast to Turkish and Ex-Yugoslav migrants for whom
re-entry into Germany may be difficult.
However, it is likely that these variables capture only some of the difference between mi-
grants who marry a native and those who marry a non-native spouse. A more thorough
assessment of the relationship between intermarriage and migrants’ home country
Figure 1 Intentions to return.
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Figures 1 and 2 depict the variation in the proportion of migrants who intend to return
and send remittances by German or non-German spouse over a 15-year period. In the
graphs, the year of marriage is defined as year zero and marked by the vertical line. Years
before marriage are indicated by negative values, hence −5 means five years before marriage.
Years after marriage are denoted by positive values. Observations go up to 10 years after
marriage. The graphs are adjusted for age at immigration and country of birth due to sub-
stantial differences among migrants by these two characteristics. The fact that the lines do
not show a persistent trend is partly the result of small sample sizes.
Figure 1 shows that migrants who marry a German have lower intensions to return
both before and after marriage than their counterparts who marry a non-German spouse.
Among women who marry a German spouse, we actually observe a drop in intentions to
return a few years before marriage. For women who marry a non-German spouse, inten-
tions to return slightly increase for a few years subsequent to marriage. We see a similar
increase in intentions to return in the years around marriage for male migrants who
marry a non-German, and their intentions to return remain high (about 87% intend to re-
turn). In comparison, far fewer men who marry a German spouse intend to return
throughout the 15-year period (roughly 77%).
By contrast, Figure 2 depicts a much smaller difference in the proportion of migrants
who send remittances and marry a German spouse rather than a non-German. Figure 2,Figure 2 Remittances sent.
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riage. The shift is especially large for men who marry a non-German spouse, among
whom, few report sending remittances before marriage. Interestingly, more men who
marry a German spouse remit before marriage than their counterparts who marry a
non-German. But after marriage slightly more male migrants who marry a non-
German remit. The number of women who remit is much more constant around mar-
riage. Similar proportions of women who marry a German and a non-German spouse
send remittances until about three years after marriage, then many women who mar-
ried a German spouse stop remitting. Observations for the year of marriage seem to be
extremely noisy and are thus excluded from the analysis.3 Empirical results
3.1 Ordinary least squares estimation
Table 3 reports the results of the OLS estimates of equation (1). The main parameters
of interest are b3 and b4, as they provide the expected difference in the three outcomes
related to home country preference – intentions to return, remittances sent and a rea-
lised return – between migrants with a German spouse and those with a non-German
spouse. Parameters b1 and b2 furthermore provide an estimate of the difference in one
of the outcomes between married migrants and singles. My hypothesis is that migrants
with a German spouse are associated with lower outcomes than migrants who marry a
non-German spouse and singles.
Ceteris paribus, married migrants have higher intensions to return than those who are
single (Columns 1 and 4). There is an expected difference of about 10-percentage points
between married and single migrants for males and females. All estimates are economic-
ally and statistically significant. But among married migrants, intermarried migrants are
associated with lower intentions to return. Male migrants who marry a German rather
than a non-German spouse before migration have an expected 14 percentage point
lower intention to return, all else equal (or 20% lower intentions)17. Similarly, the
difference between the two groups is 18-percentage points for males who marry
after migration (or 29%). This means that among male migrants who marry a native,
intentions to return are roughly a fourth lower than among their counterparts who
marry a non-native. Among female migrants, the effect of intermarriage is stronger
with 26-percentage points. That is, among women who marry a German spouse, in-
tentions to return are an expected 38% or, roughly speaking, a third lower than for
women who marry a non-German. All differences are statistically significant.
While intentions to return are generally higher among married migrants than sin-
gles, migrants who marry a native spouse not only are less likely to intend to return
than those who marry a non-native, but also less likely than singles. Male migrants
who marry a native before migration have (0.098 – 0.143) = − 0.045 or 5 percentage
points lower expected intentions to return than singles (or 6%). The difference is,
however, not significant at the 10% level. Males who marry after migration have
(0.103 – 0.183) = − 0.08 or about 8 percentage points lower intentions to return (or
13%). This difference is significant at the 10% level. For female migrants, the differ-
ence in intentions to return is 15 and 18 percentage points, respectively. The results
suggest that migrants who marry a native have lower intentions to return than those
Table 3 OLS regressions
Male Female
Intentions Remittances Return Intentions Remittances Return
Coeff. SE. Coeff. SE. Coeff. SE. Coeff. SE. Coeff. SE. Coeff. SE.
Married before migration 0.098*** 0.037 −0.024* 0.023 0.033* 0.019 0.127*** 0.036 0.038** 0.016 −0.045** 0.022
Married in Germany before SOEP 0.103*** 0.031 0.030 0.019 −0.026 0.016 0.074** 0.031 0.045*** 0.014 −0.072*** 0.019
Married before migration * German spouse −0.143*** 0.072 −0.023 0.0445 −0.085** 0.039 −0.273*** 0.083 −0.036 0.038 −0.095* 0.053
Married in Germany * German spouse −0.183 0.041 −0.078*** 0.025 −0.039* 0.022 −0.253*** 0.058 −0.058** 0.025 −0.058 0.035
Single reference group
Entry before 16 −0.045 0.031 −0.037* 0.019 −0.030* 0.016 −0.005 0.029 −0.016 0.013 −0.031* 0.018
16 ≤ Age at entry > 22 Reference group
22≤ Age at entry > 29 0.039 0.028 0.010*** 0.018 −0.016 0.015 −0.009 0.028 0.009 0.013 −0.007 0.018
29≤ Age at entry 0.069* 0.036 0.091*** 0.023 −0.006 0.019 −0.024 0.031 0.014 0.014 0.026 0.020
Years since migration (first tercile) Reference group
Years since migration (second tercile) 0.029 0.036 0.179*** 0.022 −0.170*** 0.018 −0.088 0.056 0.052** 0.023 −0.165*** 0.032
Years since migration (third tercile) −0.045 0.091 0.235*** 0.052 −0.464*** 0.044 −0.156** 0.068 0.070** 0.029 −0.165*** 0.032
Years of education 0.004* 0.002 0.003** 0.001 0.007*** 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.001
German spoken −0.063*** 0.023 −0.025* 0.015 0.003 0.012 −0.114*** 0.022 0.008 0.010 0.016 0.014
Children in household −0.010 0.008 0.009* 0.005 −0.002 0.004 −0.005 0.008 −0.006* 0.003 −0.006 0.005
Personal monthly income (lowest group) Reference group
Personal monthly income (lowest) 0.050** 0.024 0.141*** 0.015 −0.015 0.013 0.002 0.023 0.021** 0.010 −0.067*** 0.015
Personal monthly income (highest) 0.005 0.026 0.263*** 0.016 −0.031** 0.013 0.088*** 0.023 0.123*** 0.010 −0.055*** 0.015
Greek Reference group
Italian −0.126*** 0.032 −0.125*** 0.020 0.067*** 0.017 −0.125*** 0.034 −0.018 0.015 0.030 0.021
Spanish −0.034 0.035 −0.072*** 0.022 0.100*** 0.018 0.011 0.037 −0.023 0.017 0.064*** 0.23
Portuguese −0.279** 0.141 −0.221*** 0.083 0.011 0.070 −0.144 0.120 −0.065 0.055 −0.042 0.076
Turkish −0.134*** 0.030 −0.013 0.018 0.013 0.015 −0.117*** 0.031 0.006 0.014 −0.002 0.019
Ex-Yugoslav −0.302*** 0.032 0.023 0.019 0.004 0.017 −0.270*** 0.032 0.033** 0.014 −0.018 0.020
Years before SOEP (first tercile) Reference group
Years before SOEP (second tercile) −0.030 0.035 −0.103*** 0.021 0.110*** 0.018 0.126** 0.055 −0.032 0.023 0.168*** 0.032
Years before SOEP (third tercile) −0.036 0.088 −0.222*** 0.051 0.395*** 0.043 0.016 0.069 −0.059** 0.030 0.216*** 0.041
Constant 0.732*** 0.047 0.059** 0.029 0.064*** 0.024 0.810*** 0.048 −0.018 0.021 0.118*** 0.029
Observations 1682 1824 1824 1534 1649 1649
R2 0.136 0.356 0.144 0.160 0.184 0.088
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for female than for male migrants.
The coefficients in Columns 2 and 5 indicate that married female migrants are more likely
to send remittances than singles (by 4 percentage points or about 40%), but among male
migrants, marriage has no clear effect. While there is no statistically significant difference in
remittances sent between those who marry after coming to Germany and singles, signifi-
cantly fewer males who marry before migration send remittances than singles (2 percentage
points fewer). Comparing migrants who marry a German and a non-German, I find that
the likelihood of sending remittances is significantly lower for those who intermarry among
both male and female migrants. The effect is economically and statistically insignificant for
male migrants who intermarry before entering the country, but male migrants who marry a
German rather than a non-German spouse after migration are associated with a 8
percentage point lower likelihood of sending remittances (or 28%), ceteris paribus. For
female migrants, the effect of intermarriage is stronger with 5 percentage points, which cor-
responds to a 45% lower probability of sending remittances. This suggests that while for
male migrants who marry a German spouse the propensity to send remittances is roughly a
fourth lower, it is almost halved for women. This implies that the magnitudes of the effect
of intermarriage on remittances is comparable to that of intentions to return or even
higher.
The OLS estimates also suggest a negative association between marriage and the propen-
sity to return to the home country (Columns 3 and 6). Men who marry after migration have
a 3 percentage point lower propensity to return, all else equal. For females, the effect of
marriage is strong and negative, with the likelihood of realising a return being 6 percentage
points lower for married women than singles. The effect of intermarriage on return is also
clearly negative for both males and females. Male migrants who intermarry before and after
migration are associated with an 9 and 4 percentage point lower propensity to return, which
corresponds to 21% or 23%, respectively. This means that among male migrants married to
a German, about a fifth fewer return than among their counterparts who marry another mi-
grant. For women, the effect of intermarriage is even stronger with 10 and 6 percentage
points, respectively (30%). Therefore, among female migrants married to a German, about a
third fewer return than among their counterparts who are married to a non-German. We
can also see that singles are the least likely to return18.
For both male and female migrants, the effect of intermarriage is similar for the three out-
comes. Among men who marry a German, a fifth realise a return, and roughly a quarter less
intend to return or remit than among their counterparts who marry a non-German. For
female migrants, about a third fewer intend to return, and only half as many report sending
remittances among women who marry a native, while about a third fewer who marry a
native return to the home country. This suggests that an intended return and remittance
behaviour are good predictors of an actual return to the home country. Moreover, I find
that the effect of intermarriage is stronger for women on all three indicators of home
country preference.
Summarizing the OLS estimates, I find a negative association between the three outcomes
measuring home country preference and marriage to a native rather than to a non-native or
being single. The results broadly support my expectations that strong social attachments in
the host country are associated with lower preferences for the home country and, moreover,
that social attachments to natives rather than non-natives in the host country are associated
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intermarriage and preference for women than for men.
Variables measuring differences in demographic and human capital characteristics be-
tween migrants in the sample indicate that those who come to Germany at a young age and
have spent some time in the host country, endowed with little human capital but relatively
more host country-specific human capital and who, moreover, have no children in the
household, are in the middle income group and are from Turkey or the Ex-Yugoslavia tend
to have considerably lower preferences for the host country than other migrants.
Above all, these results indicate that intermarriage explains some of the heterogeneity in
return. However, it is possible that the observed differences are not directly related to inter-
marriage, as they are, for example, a result of higher levels of integration among migrants
who intermarry. By estimating a fixed effects model in the next part of the paper, I explore
whether intermarriage itself or other personal characteristics by which migrants who inter-
marry are selected describe the heterogeneity in return.3.2 Fixed effects
An analysis of the change in home country preference with marriage should provide a less
biased measure of the relationship between intermarriage and home country preference. To
estimate the fixed effects model, I construct the means of the observations for the two out-
come variables – intentions to return and remittances sent – over a five-year period before
marriage and for a five-year period after marriage. Because I only have observations from
before marriage for migrants who marry after entering SOEP, I rely on this sub-sample to
estimate equation (3). The sub-sample is very small, and taking the average of the observa-
tions in periods before and after marriage has the purpose of minimising variation due to
these small sample sizes. The year of marriage is excluded from the analysis, as it acts as a
confounder. The constant term, labelled married in the table, can be interpreted as the ef-
fect of marriage on home country preferences. The coefficient of the variable German
spouse provides an estimate of the difference in mean intentions to return or remittances
sent before and after marriage of migrants who marry a German and those who marry a
non-German spouse. Estimation results are reported in Table 4. Columns 1 and 2 describe
the estimates of the effect of intermarriage on intentions to return for male and female
migrants, respectively, and columns 3 and 4 provide the coefficients for remittances sent
for men and women.Table 4 Fixed effects
Intentions to return Remittances sent
Male Female Male Female
German spouse 0.012 −0.039 −0.094** −0.046
(0.071) (0.101) (0.044) (0.042)
Married −0.099*** −0.072* 0.116*** 0.050***
(0.036) (0.042) (0.023) (0.017)
Observations 181 129 191 144
R2 0.000 0.001 0.023 0.008
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the
1 % level. I use observations up to and marriage, including 5 years before and after but exclude the year of marriage.
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intentions before and after marriage, there is a 4 percentage point larger decrease in inten-
tions to return among females who marry a native spouse than among those who marry a
non-native. The effect is of the expected sign but relatively weak and not statistically signifi-
cant. The negative coefficient for Married indicates that female migrants have lower inten-
tions to return when married than when single. Specifically, with marriage, female migrants
experience a drop of 7 percentage points in intentions to return. This effect is significant.
For male migrants, the coefficient on intentions to return indicates that men who marry a
German spouse experience a 1 percentage point smaller decrease in intentions to return
after marriage than their counterparts who marry a non-German spouse. The coefficient is
very small and insignificant (t = 0.169). Moreover, coefficients are imprecisely estimated due
to small sample sizes. Therefore, it seems inadequate to attribute too much weight to this
estimate. Table 4, furthermore, shows that the effect of marriage is strong and negative for
male migrants. That is, intentions to return decrease by 10 percentage points with marriage.
This suggests that the fixed cost of return migration increases with marriage because of the
increased household size.
It is clear that neither of the estimates holds up to the large difference in intentions to re-
turn between intermarried migrants and those married to another migrant predicted by the
OLS model. For the sub-sample of migrants who marry after entering Germany, the OLS
results indicate a difference of 18 percentage points in intentions to return between male
migrants who marry a German and their counterparts who marry a non-German, while the
fixed effects model estimates a difference of only 1 percentage point19. For women, the ex-
pected difference between the two groups is as large as 25 percentage points according to
the OLS estimates, versus the small difference of 4 percentage points provided by the fixed
effects estimates. The effect of intermarriage obviously disappears when I control for unob-
served variables. This suggests that much of the difference in intentions to return between
the two groups is due to selection, and the relationship between intentions to return and
intermarriage is spurious. This conclusion is also in line with the pattern observed in Fig-
ure 1. While migrants who marry a German spouse have much lower intentions to return
than their counterparts who marry a non-German, the gap between the two groups is,
roughly speaking, the same before and after marriage. In other words, there is no change in
intentions to return with intermarriage.
Columns 3 and 4 report the difference in remittances behaviour before and after marriage
comparing migrants who marry a German and a non-German spouse for males and fe-
males, respectively. Both coefficients are negative and thus indicate that there is a larger dif-
ference between the two groups after marriage than before the event, judging by the
probability of sending remittances. Male migrants have a reduced likelihood of 9.4 percent-
age points in sending remittances after marriage than before if they marry a German rather
than a non-German spouse. The coefficient is economically big and statistically significant
at the 5% level. For females, the effect of intermarriage is smaller and statistically insignifi-
cant with 4.6 percentage points20. The estimate for Married indicates a positive and signifi-
cant association between marriage and remittances sent. Male migrants have a 12
percentage point lower likelihood of sending remittances after marriage than before the
event. For female migrants, the effect of marriage is 5 percentage points, meaning that
women are 5 percentage points less likely to remit when they are married than when single.
This difference is significant at all levels.
Weber IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:7 Page 16 of 21Taking the OLS estimates as a baseline, we can see that the magnitude of the coefficients
estimated by the two models is very similar. The OLS model predicts a difference of 8
percentage points in the likelihood of sending remittances for men who marry a German ra-
ther than a non-German spouse and a difference of 6 percentage points for female migrants.
This suggests that differences are not driven by selection and that there is an association be-
tween remittance behaviour and intermarriage even after controlling for unobserved vari-
ables. These results are also consistent with changes in remittance behaviour around
marriage observed in Figure 2, which indicates an upward shift in remittances sent after
marriage among both male migrants who marry a German and those who marry a non-
German spouse. For men who marry a German spouse, it is, however, less extreme, partly
because they remit more before marriage. Figure 2 panel b shows that among female
migrants, a difference only becomes apparent about three years after marriage when many
women who marry a native stop sending remittances. Overall, the evidence indicates a
negative and significant association between sending remittance and intermarriage.
In summary, the fixed effects estimates show that the negative relationship between inter-
marriage and intentions to return is spurious. Much of the difference in intentions to return
between migrants who marry a German and those who marry a non-German spouse is ex-
plained by selection into the respective marriage type. This is evidence against my hypoth-
esis that intermarriage is associated with intentions to return. Still, it does not in-and-of-
itself refute that interactions with a spouse-to-be influencing intentions to return, as many
partners meet prior to marriage. Native spouses may therefore already have an effect on mi-
grants’ intentions to return during the courting stage or in the period of cohabitation21. In-
deed, Figure 2 panel b shows a drop in intended return prior to marriage among women
who marry a German spouse.
In contrast, the association between sending remittances and intermarriage persists even
when I control for unobserved variables, indicating that remittance behaviour changes with
intermarriage. In other words, if conditional on education, age at migration, and so on, the
person who someone falls in love with has a random element, then it might be that mi-
grants who randomly fall in love with a native are less likely to send remittances. This is evi-
dence in support of my hypothesis. A possible explanation for why marriage to a native
results in lower remittances is that with intermarriage, migrants become more invested in
forming network ties in the host country than maintaining those at home, or perhaps inter-
married migrants are able to facilitate reunification with family members at the destination.
A number of studies show that migrants are much more likely to remit to close relatives
than to friends. For example, in their experimental paper, De Arcangelis et al. (2015) find
that additional remitting due to education labels largely occurs within the most closely con-
nected household in the Philippines. If remittances are primarily sent to parents or siblings,
why do they decrease post-marriage to a native? There are a number of additional charac-
teristics of the migrants and their families that are likely to influence migrants’ remittance
behaviour, for example, whether the migrant’s immediate family lives in the country of ori-
gin, the income of migrants and recipients, income volatility and current and expected
levels of unemployment at home and destination. It is beyond the scope of the paper to
provide conclusive remarks on this issue, as I lack systematic information on these
characteristics.
Overall, I find both a direct effect of intermarriage on migrants’ preferences for the home
country and evidence of the importance of selection. On the one hand, a change in
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vations to return over time, captured by variation in marital status. On the other hand, mi-
grants who intermarry have lower intensions to return already before marriage. If migrants
are indeed selected into marriage type by their intentions to return, this could mean that an
intended return influences cultural integration and explains disparate integration patterns
among migrants. Overall, the difference of the effect of intermarriage in the two outcomes
highlights the importance of using multiple variables to proxy for migrants’ home country
preference.4 Robustness checks
In order to check the robustness of the OLS and fixed effects estimates, I run several add-
itional regressions. The main purpose of the control variables in the OLS model is to pick
up differences between migrants that influence both home country preference and the like-
lihood to intermarry. In my first set of robustness checks, I, therefore, include dummies
identifying region of residence. These provide basic proxies for the size of the minority
group, the availability of prospective partners and the degree of racial, socio-economic and
residential heterogeneity that are likely to influence intermarriage rates as well as controlling
for region-specific externalities in the host country that influence home country preference
(Blau et al. 1982; Blau et al. 1984; South and Messner 1986). The main result is unchanged,
but estimates are less precise. I also control only for personal income due to a high degree
of multicollinearity between this variable and employment status and household income.
Second, I estimate the fixed effects model, adding time-changing covariates, such as in-
come and labour force status. The estimates for the effect of intermarriage are similar, and I
choose the simplest model for the analysis because more variables are likely to make the es-
timates more imprecise due to the high persistency in income and labour force status over
time. I also estimate the model with an interaction term German spouse* Turkish
because Turkish migrants are the largest migrant group in the sample, but estimates of the
coefficients do not change much. Though the model seems robust, it is clear that estimates
are imprecise due to small sample size; it would be of interest to explore the issue in a larger
sample. In general, the fixed effects estimates are likely to be a lower bound because indi-
viduals in my sample of migrants who marry while in SOEP are very young at immigration
(10 is the average age of entry for men and 9 for women). I expect that the effect of inter-
marriage is smaller for migrants who enter the country at an early age, because they are
likely to be already better integrated before marriage than those who spend less time in the
host country before marriage (Dribe and Lundh 2008; Nekby 2010).
Finally, there are a number of additional sample problems that I do not explicitly address
in this paper. The first problem relates to the variables that define singles and measure re-
turn. These variables are censored, meaning that they do not pick up migrants who marry
after leaving SOEP, and migrants who return at some later point may be erroneously coded
as stayers. However, because I look at a 28 year period, it is likely that most who intended
to marry and return did so within this time period. Even migrants who entered the country
when they were still young reach marriageable age while in the survey. I therefore assume
that the observation period covers most marriages and returns.
A second problem is that the sample is choice based. Migrants who have a higher propen-
sity to stay in Germany are also more likely to be observed in the panel because many
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and the survey year. To solve this problem requires modelling the process of choice based
sampling. This is beyond the scope of the present paper. Rather, I address the issue by con-
trolling for the time elapsed between immigration and joining SOEP. That is, I control for
differences between migrants who have been in Germany for a long time before entering
SOEP and those who have not. The coefficients are significant in the OLS regressions, espe-
cially so in the model estimating the propensity to return, which indicates that I control for
some of the differences between the migrants sampled and the actual immigrant stock.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I argue that motivations to return are likely to change with time in the host
country as migrants integrate, establish a social network, form ties with natives or even
marry a spouse from the host country. I analyse the association between intermarriage and
migrants’ preferences for the home country using German panel data on migrants’ return
intentions, remittances and return realisations. I establish a negative relationship between
the indicator variables and intermarriage, conditional on a set of variables that capture dif-
ferences in other determinants of home country preference. I also find that the effect of
intermarriage on home country preference is stronger for female than for male migrants.
However, this simple association may confound the effect of a German spouse on prefer-
ence and the effect of preferences on choice of spouse. If the latter is the sole cause for the
coefficient estimates, then I should not observe an association between intermarriage and
home country preference when I estimate a fixed effects model. However, if the former is
the cause, this is an indication of a change in preference with intermarriage and an associ-
ation between preference and intermarriage even when controlling for selection. My results
indicate that both selection and direct effects of intermarriage on home country preferences
are important. First, I find that the relationship between intentions to return and intermar-
riage goes away when I control for unobserved variables, which is evidence to suggest that
the association is due to selection. Second, the relationship between intermarriage and re-
mittances sent holds in the fixed effects model, and the estimated coefficients are of the
same magnitude as the OLS effects. This leads me to conclude that remittance behaviour
changes with marriage and differently so for migrants who marry a spouse from the host
country than migrants who marry another migrant. These results support the conjecture
that migrants’ home country preferences change with intermarriage but that it is also im-
portant to take potential confounders due to selection into account. From the empirical per-
spective, it turns out to be valuable to have more than one proxy variable for home country
preferences.
As an immediate consequence, my findings provide a better understanding of the
relationship between integration and preferences for the home country as well as changes
in the latter over the duration of stay in the host country. This is important for interpreting
observed integration patterns and for predicting how migrants might respond to policies
that aim at integrating migrants into the host country society.Endnotes
1See Chiswick (1978), Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982), Borjas (1989), Ramos (1992),
Dustmann (1993), Duleep (1994), Lindstrom and Massey (1994), Borjas and Bratsberg
Weber IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:7 Page 19 of 21(1996), Borjas (2000), Dustmann (2000), Edin et al. (2000), Longva (2001), Nekby
(2002), Bellemare (2007), Lubotsky (2007), Rooth and Saarela (2007), Dustmann et al.
(2011), and the references therein.
2See Djajic and Milbourne (1988), Dustmann (2001), Dustmann and Kirchkamp
(2002) for such models.
3See for example Dustmann (1996).
4Dustmann's (1996, pp. 232) finding that migrants who are married to a native have lower
intentions to return than migrants married to a non-native spouse is line with my
hypothesis.
5See Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964).
6While Meng and Gregory (2005), Meng and Meurs (2006), Celikaksoy (2007), Gevrek
(2009), Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2010) and Dribe and Nystedt (2014) show that the
intermarriage premium persists even after controlling for endogeneity, Kantarevic (2004),
Nekby (2010), Nottmeyer (2014) and Belevander and Irastorza (2014) find evidence that the
positive effect of intermarriage on economic integration disappears once they control for se-
lection. Also see my Master’s dissertation for a more thorough review of the literature
(Weber 2014).
7See also Klinthäll (2004), who finds that marital status reveals some of the heterogeneity
in return migration. He furthermore suspects that differing marital choices – marriage to a
spouse from the host country or another migrant – are a likely explanation behind this
result, but he does not test the hypothesis as his database lacks systematic information on
spouses.
8Meng and Gregory (2005), Gevrek (2009), Kantarevic (2004) rely on the two instru-
ments of group size and sex ratios; however, it is unclear how effective they are and are
therefore not used in this study.
9The fixed effects model is by no means equivalent to an experiment with well-defined
identification mechanisms in which the treatment, in this case being married to a partner
of a certain ethnicity, could be viewed as truly randomised. Nevertheless, the resulting es-
timates on home country preference depict whether migrants’ preference changes with
intermarriage.
10See Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005), Wagner et al. (2007) and Wagner et al.
(2008) for a more detailed description of the German Socio-Economic Panel.
11For a discussion on the guest worker migration to Germany, see Chin (2007) and
Castles and Kosack (1985); See also Münz and Ulrich (1997) and Bauer et al. (2005) for
an overview on migration in Germany.
12I disregard information on divorce and second marriage in this analysis, although pro-
vided by SOEP, because only few migrants in the sample report divorcing or marrying a sec-
ond time. Also, considering the small sample sizes, dividing the sample into too many
groups is likely to reduce the reliability of the results.
13Many studies exclude this group from their analysis (Meng and Gregory 2005;
Dribe and Lundh 2008; Gevrek 2009; Nekby 2010), but Nottmeyer (2014), for example,
also keeps it in the sample.
14Dustmann (2003b) also constructs his analysis on this argument.
15Previous work has found little difference between migrants who marry a migrant
from the same country of birth and those who marry a migrant from another country
of birth (see, Dribe and Lundh 2008; Nekby 2010).
Weber IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:7 Page 20 of 2116I include respondents who report coming from one of the successor states of Yugoslavia
in the category Ex-Yugoslavia, as migrants may have changed the information during or
after the war. Nottmeyer (2014) and Kuhlenkasper and Steinhardt (2012) also do this.
17The percentage difference is calculated as follows: b3/(average value) from Table 1.
For example, (− 0.143/0.73) = − 0.196 or rounded to - 20%.
18As intentions and remittances are obviously good predictors of actual return, I also
ran the OLS regression of realised return on these two variables in addition to the rest
of the demographic and human capital variables. The effect of intermarriage and mar-
riage is similar to the one presented in the specification above. Furthermore, I find that
intentions to return are strongly and positively associated with return, but remittances
are strongly and negatively associated with return. The association between sending re-
mittances and return seems to be confounded with income, as the two variables are
highly correlated. I do not include the results in the paper because of problems with
endogeneity that I do not have valid instruments to control for. However, the results
are available from the author on request.
19I refer the sub-sample of migrants who marry after coming to Germany but before
entry into SOEP, as it is more similar to the sub-sample of migrants who marry after
entering SOEP than that of migrants who marry before coming to Germany.
20It may be that the coefficient for female migrants is insignificant because few
women in the sample report sending remittances, which possibly indicates a downward
bias in my results.
21Nekby (2010) and Dribe and Nystedt (2014) find that most of the intermarriage
premium is already visible at the time of marriage, indicating that the courting stage or
period of cohabitation may have a non-trivial effect.
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